

*Chrono*

6 DEC 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT: Need for Increased Security Controls  
in T-EE and Related Systems

REFERENCE: Memorandum to the DCI from Director  
of Security, dated 23 October 1963,  
same subject

1. The problems raised in referenced document are substantial, complex and, by their very nature, difficult of completely satisfactory resolution from the various points of view of a collector, an analyst, or a security officer. This difficulty, however, should not inhibit the review of the present control systems and points vis-a-vis the growing variety and sensitivity of the technical collection vehicles.

2. The problem involved here has been relatively well stated by one of my staff in the following language:

"Our dilemma is that we have constructed a collection capability which is so vast and accurate in its information-collecting powers that it has tremendous application to many aspects of intelligence. Some like to think that the information should be passed to policymakers without apparently realizing that there are many vital intelligence functions which without access to overhead reconnaissance information would be proceeding on very inaccurate information."

3. I have several observations to make on your proposal following which I should like to suggest an alternate course of action for formulating recommendations on the control of this problem for the approval of the DCI. The Directorate

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of Science and Technology is involved in practically every security aspect contained in the T-KN and related systems. We operate unilaterally, and in concert with the U. S. Air Force, overhead reconnaissance collection vehicles. We are a consumer, through our Office of Scientific Intelligence, of the information derived from these technical collection vehicles. We are intimately involved in arriving at determinations on "need-to-know" both because one of my Special Assistants, Mr. Reber, is the TALENT-KEYHOLE Control Officer for the Agency and because of my own delegation of authority to grant access approvals for non-CIA operational programs conducted by the National Reconnaissance Office. In consideration of this unique grouping of responsibilities within one Directorate, we have more than a passing interest in the problem. The mix of these responsibilities leads me to observe that valid argumentation can easily be advanced to assign to this Directorate as "executive agent" of the DCI the responsibility to develop and implement a special dissemination control system for sensitive photographic intelligence derived from collection vehicles employing new and significantly improved techniques. Such a responsibility as this was recommended in your paragraph 11.a(1) to be assigned to NPIC. I do not concur with that recommendation because I do not believe that NPIC is or can be staffed with individuals sufficiently knowledgeable of certain of the technical details of the collection media so as to arrive at proper value judgments in making determinations bearing on source protection. The basic purpose for the existence of NPIC may also militate against the assignment of such a control responsibility.

4. I think also there is much need for discussion on your observations on the "gradual erosion of security" that appear in paragraph 4 of reference. There seems to be some confusion as to whether you here speak of an expansion of "need-to-know" in fields where we are pushing the state of the art in technical collection vehicles or whether you speak of the dissemination of the take from such vehicles. Quite obviously, the determination of "need-to-know" and the limits of dissemination are arrived at by different processes of reasoning in both cases. This is an issue which should be more thoroughly pursued, in my opinion, before I would be prepared to make considered recommendations to the Director for approval.

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5. My recommendation to you is that referenced paper be withdrawn and you convene a working group representing Agency components having collection, analytical, production, and security responsibilities. This group should address itself to some of the basic ingredients of the problem and endeavor to establish acceptable relationships between the tremendous volume represented by our collection media and the insatiable appetite for "take" on the part of the analyst and the producer. The differences in the need for source protection as opposed to the protection of information acquired by such sources should also be pursued in greater depth. I am of the opinion that such a group will better distill the problem and analyze its component parts than has heretofore taken place. Hopefully then, recommendations can be formulated which give credence to the competing but understandable needs of the collector, the analyst, and the security officer.

[REDACTED]

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Deputy Director  
(Science and Technology)

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